This article explains coup activity in democracies by adapting insights from the literature on commitment problems and framing coup around the threats leaders and potential coup plotters pose to each other. The author uses several data sets of coup activity and democratic constraints to find significant differences in coup activity between democracies and non-democracies.
Democratic constraints on executive power inhibit a leader’s ability to repress threats from political rivals, which decreases motivations for coups but at the same time makes democracies more vulnerable to coup attempts.
Democracies are about half as likely to use coup-related repression as civilian non-democracies, but they face a similar frequency of coup attempts.
Coups attempted against democracies are more likely to succeed.
Written byConor Seyle, Jens Vestergaard Madsenon September 16, 2016
Addressing the developing crisis around irregular migration by sea will require international institutions to work quickly to address the humanitarian, practical, and legal challenges posed by irregular migration. Applying lessons learned from the
Written byCurtis Bell, Patrick W. Keyson August 15, 2016
Few cross-national studies provide evidence of a relationship between environmental scarcity and conflict, although much of the literature claims that destabilizing effects of environmental crises can be mitigated by the right sociopolitical