Since the end of the Cold War, the military coup d’état has become the greatest threat to transitional democracies around the world. This policy brief provides a series of recommendations based on a recent study on coup in transitional democracy published in Comparative Political Studies under the title “Coup d’État and Democracy.” This research urges greater attention to how new democracies can, with the help of the international community, convince military elites to stay out of politics without relying on repression.
Military elites are powerful figures in nondemocratic governments, so they may want to retain that influence during transitions to democracy. So as to reduce coup risk, transitional governments should actively work to include them in political transitions.
Constraints on executive authority (i.e., checks and balances) prevent the leaders of transitional democracies from “coup-proofing” as effectively as the comparatively unconstrained leaders of nondemocratic states, so international actors must work harder to preemptively condemn and prevent coups against new democracies.
Organizations working in transitional democracies should be aware that while democratization does not increase the frequency of coup attempts, it does roughly double the chances that an attempted coup will be successful. Organizations should have contingency plans for attempted and successful coups in newly democratic states.
Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP), a project of the One Earth Future Foundation; the International Maritime Bureau (IMB); and the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Programme (MPHRP) are pleased to present the Human Cost of Maritime Piracy, 2012.
Past research on business engagement with human rights, peace, and security has identified specific reasons why national and transnational companies may be interested in participating, as well as how they have contributed to protecting human rights
Written byConor Seyle, David Cortright, Kristen Wallon April 26, 2013
This white paper offers a synthetic review of empirical evidence on the elements of state governance that affect interstate and intrastate armed conflict. In the first part of the paper we examine state capacity and institutional quality.
Written byDanielle Jung, Wendy H. Wong, Lindsay Hegeron November 15, 2012
How does the way in which a group organizes change the lethality of the group's attacks? In this article, we argue that groups organized vertically as hierarchies are likely to conduct more lethal attacks.